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SALES TO GRANTOR TRUSTS:
A CASE STUDY OF WHAT
THE IRS AND CONGRESS CAN DO TO CURB
AGGRESSIVE TRANSFER TAX TECHNIQUES
JAY A. SOLED & MITCHELL GANS**
Sales to grantortrusts produce magnificent transfer tax savings. Such savings raise an important
policy question: What can the IRS and Congress each do to eliminate this and other transfertax savings
devices that erode the transfer tax base? While this analysis does not pretend to have all the answers, it
presents straightforwardandpracticalsolutions to many of the problems plaguingthe nation's transfer
tax system using sales to grantortrusts as a case study.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job
Creation Act of 2010, Congress temporarily raised the applicable exclusion
amount-the dollar figure that taxpayers can pass free of transfer tax (i.e.,
estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes)-from $1 million to $5
million.' This law is set to expire at the end of 2012, at which time the $1
million applicable exclusion amount is scheduled to return. 2 In two years, if
Congress wishes to maintain the $5 million applicable exclusion amount
and avoid costing the federal coffer billions of dollars in lost revenue, it will
have to eliminate several of the most utilized tax-saving devices in estate
planning. The devices currently under consideration for elimination
include the so-called zeroed-out, grantor-retained annuity trusts (GRATs),4
minority and marketability valuation discounts for certain intrafamily
transfers, and qualified personal residence trusts.6 These staples of the
estate planning world have been part of the panoply of tools that
practitioners have devised to minimize taxpayers' transfer tax burdens.
Notwithstanding congressional attention to the elimination of these
mainstay planning tools, there has been no discussion in Washington, D.C.
to date about eradicating other commonplace transfer tax-savings devices.
One such device is known as a sale to a grantor trust, which can replace
many of the devices under consideration for the congressional knife and
1.

Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 303, 124 Stat. 3296 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Tax Relief

Act].
Id. §§ 101-03.
For a discussion pertaining to the possible elimination of several estate planning
devices, see GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2011
REVENUE PROPOSALS (Feb. 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/
Documents/greenbkl0.pdf.
4. See, e.g., James M. Delaney, Split Interest Valuation: The Devil Is in the Detail,
37 CAP. U. L. REv. 929, 954 (2009) ("With the evolution of the zeroed-out GRAT, the estate
planning profession seems to have once again frustrated the goals of the Treasury.").
5. See, e.g., Brant J. Hellwig, On Discounted PartnershipInterests and Adequate
Consideration, 28 VA. TAX REv. 531, 533 (2009) ("Family limited partnerships have
dominated the judicial landscape in the estate and gift tax arena for nearly a decade....
Their principal advantage lies in the prospect of significant estate and gift tax savings
generated through the exploitation of discounts used to value equity interests in closely held
entities."). See generally Laura E. Cunningham, Remember the Alamo: The IRS Needs
Ammunition in Its Fight Against the FLP, 86 TAX NOTES 1461 (2000) (describing the
legislative action needed to eliminate the tax advantages of the family limited partnership);
Leo L. Schmolka, FLPs and GRA TS: What to Do?, 86 TAX NOTES 1473 (2000) (proposing
solutions to several tax loopholes including family limited partnerships).
6. See, e.g., Denver S. Gilliand, FractionalInterests Make a Better QPRT, 32 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 145, 180 (1997) ("[Qualified Personal Residence Trusts], as an
exception to the Chapter 14 valuation rules, offer some significant estate tax planning
opportunities.").
2.
3.
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achieve similar transfer tax savings. While nothing is certain, estate
planners will likely switch gears in the aftermath of the likely transfer tax
system overhaul and use sales to grantor trusts, among other techniques, to
fill the void left by the absence of comparable transfer tax-savings devices.
In anticipation of taxpayers' attempts to minimize their transfer tax
obligations, this analysis uses sales to grantor trusts as a case study of what
can be done to protect the transfer tax base from erosion. In the sections
that follow, we outline how the IRS and Congress should each respond to
the emergence of sales to grantor trusts and other transfer tax-savings
devices that ultimately become taxpayers' methods of choice to defeat their
transfer tax obligations. In Section II, we overview how sales to grantor
trusts operate and how they compare to other transfer tax savings devices.
In Section III, we point out how such sales and other transfer tax savings
devices are vulnerable to challenges by the IRS. In Section IV, we suggest
ways that Congress can stem taxpayers' use of sales to grantor trusts and
other planning devices designed to circumvent transfer tax obligations. In
Section V, we offer our conclusions.
II. SALES TO GRANTOR TRUSTS: How THEY OPERATE AND COMPARE TO
OTHER TRANSFER TAX MINIMIZATION TECHNIQUES

Close to a century ago, Congress instituted the estate tax; 9 ever since
then, taxpayers have sought creative ways to minimize their transfer tax
burdens.' In the estate planning sphere, some forms of taxpayers'
"creativeness" have been deemed impermissible by the courts;" however,
other such forms have been sanctioned by the courts, and, as a result, they
have been added to practitioners' stores of acceptable estate planning

7. See Robert T. Danforth, A Proposalfor Integrating the Income and Transfer
Taxation of Trusts, 18 VA. TAX REv. 545, 619 (1999) (discussing "the use of grantor trust
status as a means of avoiding estate and gift taxes").
8. Compare George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated
Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 161 (1977) (describing how, when it comes to
transfer taxes, taxpayers have devised numerous ways to skirt their obligations), with Paul L.
Caron & James R. Repetti, The Estate Tax Non-Gap: Why Repeal a Voluntary Tax?, 20
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 153 (2009) (describing how the estate tax imposes a significant
transfer tax burden on most of the nation's largest estates).
9. Act of September 8, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 2(b), 39 Stat. 756.
10. See, e.g., Richard Schmalbeck, Avoiding Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, in
RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 113 (William G. Gale, James R. Hines, Jr. & Joel
Slemrod eds., 2001) (exploring some of the historical ways in which taxpayers have sought
to alleviate their transfer tax burdens).
11.
See, e.g., Heyen v. United States, 945 F.2d 359, 365 (10th Cir. 1991)
(disregarding as a sham a taxpayer's use of twenty-seven unrelated straw people to obtain
twenty-seven additional annual exclusions for gifts to the taxpayer's family).
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devices.12 To date, insofar as courts have not challenged the viability of
sales to grantor trusts, such transactions fall squarely within the scope of the
latter category. In the subsections below, (A) we explore how a sale to a
grantor trust operates, and (B) we compare this technique to other transfer
tax minimization techniques.
A. How a Sale to a GrantorTrust Operates
Utilized as a device to achieve transfer tax savings, a sale to grantor
trust constitutes a complex arrangement. As set forth below, we outline how
practitioners orchestrate this arrangement, its income tax and transfer tax
implications, and why taxpayers have found its use attractive from a
transfer tax perspective.
Before analyzing this complex arrangement, however, some basic
fundamentals are in order. Subchapter J of the Code governs the income
taxation of trusts and estates. Subpart E of Subchapter J sets forth special
rules for grantor trusts and the fact that such trusts are essentially ignored
for income tax purposes (i.e., in most instances, the grantor and the trust are
treated as one-and-the-same taxpayer).13 I.R.C. §§ 673 through 679 set forth
the criteria that result in part or all of a trust having grantor trust status.14 If
a trust has grantor trust status, the tax-reporting obligations of such a trust
are generally negligible.
Although the separate existence of grantor trusts is generally ignored
for income tax purposes, the same fate does not hold true for estate tax
purposes. To the contrary, the assets in a grantor trust will not be included
in the grantor's gross estate if properly drafted.17 This disparate tax
treatment between income and estate taxes, in which the former ignores
12. See, e.g., Patrick T. Neil, "Bare"ly Legal: The Evolution of Naked Crummey
Powers and a Callfor Reform, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 923 (2003) (discussing how the Tax
Court's decision in Estate of Cristofani v. Comm'r, 97 T.C. 74 (1991) sanctioned transfers
made into a trust for the benefit of remote beneficiaries and how such transfers qualified for
the present interest annual exclusion).
13. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.671-1(a) (as amended in 1980), 1.671-3(a)(1) (as amended in
1969); Rev. Rul. 57-390, 1957-2 C.B. 326. Compare Rothstein v. United States, 735 F.2d
704, 710 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that for income tax purposes, a transaction between a
taxpayer and a grantor trust should be respected and taxed accordingly), with Rev. Rul. 8513, 1985-1 C.B. 184 (ruling that transactions between a grantor and a grantor trust cannot
have income tax significance).
14. See Leo L. Schmolka, Selected Aspects of the GrantorTrust Rules, in THE NINTH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING 1400 (1975) (discussing the criteria for treatment
of a trust as a grantor trust).
15. See Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4 (as amended in 2006) (stating the tax obligations of
grantor trusts).
16. See I.R.C. § 2033 (2006) (including in a decedent's estate those assets in which
decedent held an interest).
17. Danforth, supra note 7, at 557.
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grantor trusts' separate existence and the latter respects their separate
existence, sets the stage for sales to grantor trusts.
Consider how a sale to a grantor trust functions. Suppose Kay owns
title to a piece of highly appreciating rental real estate with a current fair
market value of $1 million and an adjusted tax basis of $200,000. Kay visits
her local estate planning attorney, who renders the following advice: Kay
should establish an irrevocable trust, the terms of which provide her with
sufficient indicia of control that, for income tax purposes, make it a grantor
trust; however, for transfer tax purposes, such indicia of control fall short of
causing inclusion of the trust's assets in Kay's gross estate.' 8 Once Kay
establishes the irrevocable trust with the precise terms described above,
Kay's attorney advises her to make a $100,000 cash contribution to the
trust. Finally, Kay's attorney proposes that after a sufficient period of time
after funding the trust, the trustee of the irrevocable trust, Bea, should
purchase title to Kay's appreciating real estate using the $100,000 cash as a
down payment and issuing a nine-year promissory note (with $100,000
annual principal payments plus applicable interest) to pay off the balance
due.19 The entirety of this proposed transaction is represented by two simple
diagrams as follows: 2 0
18. There are several ways to accomplish this goal. Probably the most common
method is to employ I.R.C. § 675(4)(C), which provides that if a person, in a non-fiduciary
capacity, has the power to switch title to assets in her own name with assets of equivalent
value held by the trust, grantor trust status is appropriate. I.R.C. § 675(4)(C) (2006).
19. When a sale is made to a trust, the IRS may attempt to invoke I.R.C. § 2036 to
bring the date-of-death value of the assets sold to the trust into the grantor's gross estate.
Even if the grantor does not retain an interest in the trust or the right to control the
management of the trust-the two predicates for invoking § 2036-the IRS may be able to
sustain this argument. In essence, the argument would be based on the view that, in
substance, the grantor's retained right to receive payments under the note constitutes a
retained income stream. Thus, if death should occur before the note is fully paid, inclusion in
the grantor's gross estate via § 2036 could occur. See generally I.R.C. § 2036 (2006)
(providing in effect that, as a general matter, the section does not apply if the grantor's
retained access ends before death).
If the IRS were to make this argument, the taxpayer would have two possible responses.
First, the taxpayer could argue that the retention of the right to receive payments under a
note generated by a sale does not constitute the retention of a right within the meaning of §
2036. See Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274, 280 n.8 (1958) (indicating in
dicta that in the case of a sale, if payments need not necessarily derive from the property
transferred and are not correlated to the income generated, the grantor should not be treated
as having retained access); see also Rev. Rul. 77-193, 1977-1 C.B. 273 (applying the
Fidelity-Philadelphiadicta, a case involving an annuity, to an installment sale). In the minds
of many practitioners, one approach to satisfying the conditions set forth in FidelityPhiladelphiais if the trust is first funded with sufficient money-often referred to as seed
money. See Becklenberg v. Comm'r, 273 F.2d 297, 301-02 (7th Cir. 1959) (applying and
upholding the ruling in Fidelity-Philadelphia).The difficulty with the seed money approach
is that the amount of seed money necessary to satisfy the requirements of the dicta is not
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STEP 1: Contribution to the Grantor Trust

Kay

$100,000

TRUST
(Bea, Trustee)

STEP 2: Trust Purchases the Real Estate Using the Contributed Cash and a Promissory
Note

Kay

$100,000 plus $900,000 Promissory Note
-

Title to the Real Estate

TRUST
(Bea, Trustee)

clear. While many suggest that ten percent of the sales prices is sufficient, see, e.g., Michael
D. Mulligan, Sale to a Defective GrantorTrust: An Alternative to a GRAT, 23 EST. PLAN. 3,
8 (1996), there is no published authority to this effect. The other difficulty with the seed
money approach is that in order to provide the trust with seed money, the grantor must make
a taxable gift into a trust, and the size of this gift might give rise to the payment of gift tax.
With the passage of the 2010 Tax Relief Act, supra note 1, this possible tax friction may no
longer be a serious impediment insofar as every taxpayer now enjoys the equivalent of a $5
million gift tax exemption, with married couples able to contribute $10 million free of gift
tax. I.R.C. § 2505(a) (2006); I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2006). Another approach used by
practitioners to satisfy the Fidelity-Philadelphiadicta is a guarantee. Under this approach,
the beneficiary of the trust guarantees that the note due to the grantor will be paid even if the
trust is unable to make payments. The cases cited by the Supreme Court in FidelityPhiladelphia suggest the viability of this approach. The "guarantee approach," however,
raises its own issues. For example, if the guarantor does not have sufficient assets, the
guarantee may be seen as more of a fagade than reality. See Estate of Fabric v. Comm'r, 83
T.C. 932 (1984) (finding that exclusion of the transferred assets from the gross estate was
proper). Also, questions have been raised as to whether a fee must be charged for the
guarantee and, if so, how much. Indeed, at one point, the IRS had suggested that in the
absence of a fee, the guarantor should be treated as having made a taxable gift. See I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-13-009 (Dec. 21, 1990) (holding that gift guarantees are considered taxable
gifts).
A second possible defense to an IRS challenge is to rely upon the bona fide and full
consideration exception to § 2036. Practitioners who counsel about this kind of sale are
understandably cautious about relying on the bona fide exception, because (i) if the IRS is
able to establish after the death of the grantor that the price was inadequate-even if
minimally inadequate-the exception may not be available, and (ii) the IRS may argue that,
even if the price was adequate, the tax-driven nature of the transaction renders the bona fide
exception inapplicable. Strangi v. Comm'r, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that assets
were properly included in taxable estate); Estate of Hughes v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH)
630, 635 (2005) (holding that assets were not includable in gross estate because they lacked
value).
20. In terms of practical reality, this proposed transaction may engender further
complexities as most practitioners would probably recommend that Kay first transfer title to
her real estate to a limited liability company, let some time expire, and then only sell a
minority portion of her limited liability company membership interest to the trust. By
"wrapping" title to her real estate in a limited liability company, Kay will likely command
useful valuation discounts. See infra Section II.B.2. For heuristic reasons, we have
purposefully chosen to ignore the additional complexity entailed by this sort of planning.
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Kay's sale of her real estate title to a grantor trust engenders both
income tax and transfer tax implications. Recall that the Code ignores the
separate existence of a grantor trust for income tax purposes;21 in a practical
sense, what this means is that the Code treats the trust as the grantor's alter
ego.22 The IRS has long ruled that for income tax purposes, transactions
that taxpayers engage in with themselves are not recognized.23 That being
the case, when Bea, in her fiduciary capacity as trustee of the grantor trust,
purchases the real estate from Kay, Kay recognizes no gain or loss (i.e.,
Kay and Bea are deemed to be one and the same).24 Consistent with the
nonrecognition concept is that the trust would hold title to the purchased
real estate with a carryover basis of $200,000.25 Due to the grantor trust
status of the trust, the rental income earned by the trust during each year of
its existence would be reportable on Kay's individual income tax return. 26
However, as installment note and interest payments are made to Kay, Kay
would not incur any income tax liability, because the receipt of these
payments would be ignored for income tax purposes. 27
For transfer tax purposes, assuming that the trust terms are properly
drafted (i.e., they do not provide Kay with any retained indicia of control
21.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
22. Craig D. Bell & Julie A. King, Sweeping Up the Two Percent Floor: Scott v.
United States and the Deductibility ofInvestment Advisory Fees, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 589, 594 (2003) ("[G]rantor trusts, . . . are historically treated as the alter egos of the
grantors[].").
23. See Rev. Rul. 85-13, supra note 13; see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-47-006
(Nov. 22, 2002) (ruling that when an owner of two separate trusts transfers a life insurance
policy from one trust to the other, the transaction will be disregarded for federal income
purposes); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-28-019 (Jul. 12, 2002) ("[A] transaction cannot be
recognized as a sale for federal income tax purposes if the same person is treated as owning
the purported consideration both before and after the transaction.").
24. See Rev. Rul. 85-13, supranote 13.
25. See id.
26. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Bridget J. Crawford, Grantor Trusts and Income
Tax Reporting Requirements: A Primer, 16 PROB. & PROP. 18, 18 (2002) ([R]etention by a
trust's grantor, or another person, of certain powers over trust property will cause that
grantor (or other person) to be deemed to be the owner for income tax purposes of some or
all of the trust property."); John B. Huffaker et al., Is Income Tax Payment by GrantorOwner of a Subpart E Trust a Taxable Gift?, 82 J. TAX'N 202, 203 (1995) (indicating that
the grantor of a grantor trust is the owner of the trust for federal income tax purposes even
though he may receive none of the benefits of the trust); Jerry Kasner, Defective IRS
Reasoning on Gift Tax Consequences of a Defective Trust, 66 TAx NOTES 1171, 1171 (1995)
("The income of the trust is taxed to the grantor, who is treated as the 'owner' of the trust for
federal income tax purposes.").
27. See Rev. Rul. 85-13, supra note 13.
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over the trust assets), title to the trust property and accumulated rental
income should not be includable in Kay's gross estate at the time of her
death.28 That being the case, even if the real estate's fair market value
soared to $5 million, its entire value would escape inclusion in Kay's
taxable estate.
The inconsistency between the income tax (which treats the trust as the
grantor's alter ego) and the estate tax (which treats the trust as a stand-alone
entity, separate from the grantor) is glaringly apparent and has long existed.
Notwithstanding entreaties from academics and other commentators to
harmonize the differences between the income and estate taxes,29 this
disparate tax treatment enables taxpayers to reap rich transfer tax savings.30
The benefits of this disparate tax treatment are essentially twofold.
First, during the trust term, taxpayers engaging in this technique are
obligated to pay the trust's income tax. 3 While the benefit of these
payments inures to the trust beneficiaries, such payments are not considered
transfers that are subject to gift tax.3 2 To illustrate, suppose in our previous
example that the trust annually earns $100,000 of rental income and that the
effective income tax rate is forty-five percent. In the absence of the grantor
trust rules, the trust bears the tax burden, resulting in the trust retaining only
$55,000 ($100,000 of income less $45,000 of taxes ($100,000 x 0.45)). But
the grantor trust nature of the trust, instead, obligates the grantor to pay the
tax on the rental income,33 resulting in the $100,000 of rental income
remaining intact and inuring to the benefit of the trust beneficiaries.
A second feature of this sales technique is that, for transfer tax
purposes, it enables taxpayers to "freeze" the value of the transferred
property.34 To illustrate, return once again to our example in which Kay
anticipated that the real estate in question would appreciate greatly in value.
If it appreciated in her name, the initial fair market value plus its
appreciation would be includable in Kay's gross estate. Instead, by making
this sale, Kay will ultimately receive $1 million ($100,000 cash down
28. See I.R.C. §§ 2036-38 (2006).
29. See, e.g., Danforth, supranote 7.
30. See, e.g., Ronald D. Aucutt, Installment Sales to Grantor Trusts, SR034 ALlABA 1013 (2010) ("[A sale to grantor trust] is in effect an estate freeze technique that
capitalizes on the lack of symmetry between the income tax rules governing grantor trusts
and the estate tax rules governing includibility in the gross estate.").
I.R.C. § 671 (2006); see also Rev. Rul. 04-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7 (ruling that a
31.
settlor's payment of income taxes attributable to a grantor trust is not a taxable gift).
32. Rev. Rul. 04-64.
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., Karen Burke, Valuation Freezes After the 1988 Act: The Impact of
2036(c) on Closely-Held Businesses, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 67, 70 (1989) ("In its
simplest form, an estate freeze involves the transfer of an interest representing future
appreciation by an older generation transferor, coupled with the retention of another interest
having a fixed value.").
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payment and a promissory note worth $900,000). This $1 million figure
represents a freeze of the amount includable in Kay's taxable estate.
The ultimate transfer tax savings associated with such sales can be
intoxicating to taxpayers. Compare the overall tax consequences were Kay
to (1) retain title to the real estate versus (2) sell this property to a grantor
trust, using the following set of assumptions: Kay's real estate generates
$100,000 of rental income annually; its value gradually increases to $5
million; the estate and income tax rates are each a flat forty-five percent;
and Kay dies in Year 10 immediately after the promissory note has been
paid in full.35
Retention of the Real Estate: If Kay retained title to the real estate,
$5,550,000 would have been includable in her taxable estate (i.e., title to
real estate worth $5,000,000 plus the after-tax rental income of $55,000 that
the property annually generated ($100,000 - $45,000 ($100,000 x 0.45))
over a ten-year period. The estate tax on $5,550,000 would be $2,497,500
($5,550,000 x 0.45), leaving a net amount of $3,052,500 to Kay's family.
Sale to Grantor Trust: Suppose instead that Kay sold title to the
foregoing real estate to a grantor trust. In this case, only $1,000,000 would
be includable in Kay's taxable estate (i.e., the initial $100,000 cash down
payment plus the aggregate $900,000 principal payment),36 producing an
overall estate tax liability of $450,000. Under this scenario, Kay's family
would own title to $5,000,000 of real estate, $1 million cash from the rental
income (free of income tax because Kay, under the grantor trust rules, bore
this burden), plus the after-transfer tax cash bequest of $550,000 (i.e., Kay's
estate has $1,000,000 from the aggregate installment payments less the
presumed $450,000 transfer tax obligation ($1 million times the forty-five
percent assumed transfer tax rate)), leaving a net amount of $6,550,000 to
Kay's family.
The significant wealth outcome variations produced under scenarios (1)
and (2) illustrate a driving force behind taxpayers' motivations to use sales
to grantor trusts. 37
35. For purposes of this illustration, assume that Kay had other assets in her estate
that absorbed her entire applicable exclusion amount via I.R.C. § 2010.
36. For purposes of this problem, we assumed that Kay used the interest payments
made on the promissory note to meet her annual income tax obligation arising with respect
to the $100,000 rental income that the trust generated. For example, if the promissory note's
interest rate was ten percent, in addition to making its first installment payment of $100,000,
the trust would also pay Kay $90,000 of interest ($900,000 x 10%). Kay could use this
interest income to meet her $45,000 income tax obligation resulting from the grantor trust
nature of the trust. In later years, when the principal balance of the promissory note is much
smaller, the interest payments due to Kay will be correspondingly smaller as well (e.g., in
Year 9, the trust's final payment would be $110,000, consisting of $100,000 of principal and
$10,000 of interest). In later years, the excess interest payments from earlier years could be
used to meet the $45,000 income tax obligation on the trust's annual rental income.
37. In the context of a sale to grantor trust scenario, Kay's beneficiaries will have a
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B. Comparisonto Other Estate PlanningMinimization Techniques
In the past, in lieu of sales to grantor trusts, taxpayers sometimes used
other estate planning techniques to minimize their transfer tax burdens.38
The reason for taxpayers' reluctance to employ this technique centers upon
a concern about inadvertently triggering gift tax liability should the value of
the sold assets be determined to be in excess of the sales price. (This
concern, however, will likely dissipate with the increase in the gift tax
exemption of $5 million adopted in 2010.)
As a general proposition, many taxpayers lack familiarity with how our
tax system operates, and this lack of familiarity is particularly acute in the
area of transfer taxes. Given this background, imagine the confusion that
discussions of sales to grantor trusts must engender. For starters, tax
professionals explaining how this technique operates will often refer to the
purchasing trust as being "defective" for income tax purposes. Why? This
is because the terms of the trust are designed to achieve grantor trust status,
and for the majority of the time that the income tax has been in existence,
this status was steadfastly avoided. 4 0 This avoidance is due to the fact that
the income of non-grantor trusts historically has been taxed at lower
marginal tax rates than that of individual taxpayers, and the income of all
grantor trusts was generally taxed at the grantor's higher marginal tax
rates. 4 1 Even though the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eradicated the tax bracket
lower tax basis in the real estate. More specifically, had Kay held title to the property until
her death, her tax basis in the real estate would have equaled $5 million in her beneficiaries'
hands. See I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2006). By contrast, by engaging in this sale to grantor trust,
Kay's beneficiaries would ultimately have a $200,000 tax basis in the transferred real estate
(i.e., Kay's initial cost basis). This tax basis differential can ultimately result in Kay's
beneficiaries bearing a larger income tax burden if and when they were to sell this real
estate. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006). Note, however, that the law regarding the beneficiaries'
basis is not entirely clear. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Mitchell M. Gans & Hugh H.
Jacobson, Income Tax Effects of Termination of Grantor Trust Status by Reason of the
Grantor's Death, 97 J. TAX'N 149, 158-59 (2002) (suggesting that the tax basis in the
beneficiaries' hands might, indeed, equal the sales price). But see I.R.S. C.C.A. 200937028
(Sept. 11, 2009) (rejecting this position).
38. See supra notes 4-6.
39. See, e.g., Stephen R. Akers, Jonathan G. Blattmachr & F. Ladson Boyle, Creating
Intentional Grantor Trusts, 44 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 207, 211 (2009) ("The term
defective was applied first to grantor trusts when the grantor trust rules originally were
adopted because, as a general matter, a grantor trust classification prevented income
splitting. Avoiding grantor trust status was the typical taxpayer goal. Thus, before 1987 the
trust was "defective" from the perspective that the trust income was taxable to the grantor
instead of the trust or a trust beneficiary. That label has carried over to today, although now
grantor trust status usually is viewed as beneficial.").
40. Id.
41. See generally Mark L. Ascher, The GrantorTrust Rules Should Be Repealed, 96
IOWA L. REV. 885 (2011).
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advantage afforded to non-grantor trusts,42 the putative scourge of being a
grantor trust has remained; hence, the moniker defective remains extant.
Once a tax professional gets beyond explaining the fact that the trust is not
truly defective, the professional then must explain the numerous steps
entailed in arranging such trust sales.
Aside from taxpayers' tendencies to shy away from those tax-saving
techniques that they cannot readily comprehend and that have a facade of
artificiality, taxpayers have discovered recently the appeal of other
techniques. The appeal of other techniques is commonly twofold: they
enjoy the imprimatur of the IRS, Congress, and/or the courts; and they can
produce more bountiful transfer tax savings relative to those offered by
sales to grantor trusts.4 ' Two such techniques are: (1) zeroed-out GRATs
and (2) valuation discounts.
1. Zeroed-Out GRATs
The framework for a zeroed-out GRAT is found in I.R.C. § 2702,
entitled "Special valuation rules in case of transfers of interest in trusts.""
The statute provides that "[t]he value of any retained interest which is not a
qualified interest shall be treated as being zero."45 For example, under this
rule, if a taxpayer contributes $1 million into a trust established for the
benefit of his children and retains a ten-year income interest (i.e., a
nonqualified interest under the Code), the value of the retained income
46
interest is deemed to be zero. Accordingly, notwithstanding the taxpayer's
retention of this valuable income right, the taxpayer will nevertheless be
deemed to have made a taxable gift of the entire $1 million trust
contribution. 7 Congress devised this approach in order to eliminate an
abusive strategy under which wealth could be moved to children and others
without the full payment of gift tax.48
42. See I.R.C. § 101(a) (2006).
43. See, e.g., Ellen K. Harrison, A Comparison of Retained Annuities and Sales to
Grantor Trusts, WL SD1O ALI-ABA 763 (1998) ("In most cases, a GRAT may be
structured to produce a minimal gift tax value .... .").
44. I.R.C. § 2702(a)(2)(A) (2006).
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See I.R.C. § 2702(a)(1).
48. In the years leading up to the enactment of I.R.C. § 2702, taxpayers established
grantor-retained income trusts (commonly known in the estate planning community as
"GRITs"). In computing the value of a taxpayer's retained-income interest, the Code
provided a rate of return equal to the I.R.C. § 7520 rate. This rate of return often made the
taxpayer's retained interest appear robust and, in contradiction, the amount of the remainder
interest (i.e., the gift) small. Meanwhile, the GRIT trustee could invest in growth assets that
produced very little income; by engaging in this kind of investment strategy, the investment
growth would inure to the trust beneficiaries and essentially escape any transfer tax
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The statute provides a major exception to the general rule of treating
the value of any retained interest as zero.49 It does so by defining a
"qualified interest" as including "any interest which consists of the ri ht to
receive fixed amounts payable not less frequently than annually." 0 By
defining a qualified interest in this straightforward fashion, Congress
thought it had eliminated opportunities for valuation abuse. Retained
amounts that are "fixed" appear to be safe from taxpayer manipulation, and
Congress affixed a rate of return on the contributed trust property equal to
the I.R.C. § 7520 rate (a rate that is issued on a monthly basis and is equal
to 120 percent of the federal midterm interest rate).5 ' The opportunity for
taxpayers to game an arrangement of this sort seemed remote, because the
value of the remainder interest could be determined with apparent

accuracy.52
Working within statutory parameters, crafty taxpayers instead designed
GRATs to be the perfect transfer tax loophole. Taxpayers' strategy was
simple: Contribute property that produced a rate of return in excess of the §
7520 rate and retain robust annuity payments such that the value of the
retained interest essentially equaled the value of the remainder interest (e.g.,
contribute $1 million into a trust but retain an interest therein slightly less
than or equal to $1 million, producing little or no taxable gift).53 If the trust
property produced a rate of return that was in excess of the § 7520 rate,
assets would remain in the trust and could pass tax-free to the named trust
beneficiaries.5 4 If the trust assets failed to produce the § 7520 rate of return,
nothing would be left in the trust, but because the up-front gift was deemed
to be zero or de minimis, the taxpayer suffered no negative consequences
for making this trust contribution. This technique, known as a "zeroed-out
GRAT," has become an essentially foolproof method of achieving transfer
tax savings with no downside risk and even the Tax Court has tacitly
sanctioned its use.56
exposure. See generally Mitchell Gans, GRIT's, GRAT's, and GRUT's: Planningand Policy,
II VA. TAX REV. 761 (1992) (explaining how taxpayers would exploit the use of GRITs in
fashions designed to minimize their transfer tax burdens).
49. See I.R.C. § 2702(a)(2)(A) (2006).
50. I.R.C. § 2702(b)(1).
I.R.C. § 7520(a)(2) (2006).
51.
52. See Grayson M. P. McCouch, Rethinking Section 2702, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 99, 99
(1994) ("In 1990, Congress added chapter 14 to the Code to address several gift and estate
tax avoidance techniques that flourished under prior law." (footnotes omitted)).
KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING
53.
STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS 22.03[2][b] (1997).

AND

WEALTH

PRESERVATION:

54. See I.R.C. §§ 2702 (a)(2)(B), 7520(a).
55. See I.R.C. § 2702(a)(2)(A).
56. See Walton v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 589 (2000), acq., IRS Notice 2003-72, 2003-2
C.B. 964 (ruling that for purposes of I.R.C. § 2702, if the transferor were to die during the
term of the retained interest, annuity payments that were to continue to be made to the
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Consider the following example. In September 2011, when the § 7520
rate was two percent, a taxpayer contributed $1 million into a two-year
GRAT and retained an annual annuity payment of $520,562. As a result of
retaining such a large annuity interest, the value of the retained interest was
deemed equal to $1 million, making the value of the corresponding taxable
gift equal to zero ($1 million trust contribution less $1 million retained
interest). At the end of Year 1, the taxpayer will receive an annuity payment
of $520,562, and after Year 2, the taxpayer will receive another annuity
payment of $520,562. At the end of the two-year period after making the
two annuity payments, if nothing remains in the trust, the GRAT will prove
unsuccessful. Conversely, at the end of the two-year period after making
the two annuity payments, if something remains in the trust, the GRAT will
prove successful, and whatever remains in the trust will transfer tax-free to
the trust's named beneficiaries. Given the absence of a downside risk, it
comes as no surprise that the establishment of zeroed-out GRATs has
spiraled as their use is regularly promoted by estate planners.
2.

Valuation Discounts

In addition to zeroed-out GRATs, another common estate planning
technique is the use of valuation discounting. Such discounting can produce
stellar transfer tax results." Under this methodology, taxpayers typically
gift or sell interests in closely held businesses. Consider the salient fact that
the interests in such business enterprises are not publicly traded on a
recognized exchange, and the owner of a non-controlling interest is unable
to direct the management of the entity. For transfer tax purposes, the
absence of a ready market coupled with a lack of control typically reduces
the value of such closely held business interests-often producing so-called
minority and marketability valuation discounts of thirt percent or more 5
under the traditional "willing buyer/willing seller" test.
transferor's estate constituted a qualified interest, thereby reducing the value of the
remainder interest). Note, however, that the IRS insists that the preamble to the regulations
under § 2702 does not contemplate that a GRAT can be zeroed out. See Tech. Adv. Memo.
2002-45-053 (Nov. 8, 2002).
57. See generally Brant J. Hellwig, On Discounted Partnership Interests and
Adequate Consideration,28 VA. TAX REv. 531 (2009); Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and
Family Limited Partnerships:A Case Study, 39 INST. ON EsT. PLAN. 500 (Tina Portuondo
ed., 2005).
58. See Louis A. Mezzullo, Valuation of Corporate Stock, 831-3d TAX MGM'T
PORTFOLIO worksheet 1 (2007); see also Brant J. Hellwig, Revisiting Bryum, 23 VA. TAX
REv. 275, 278-79 (2003) ("With courts frequently sustaining combined minority-interest
and marketability discounts in the range of 30-50% from proportionate value, the use of
limited partnerships for estate-planning purposes is widely regarded as undermining the
integrity of the estate tax." (footnotes omitted)).
59. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965) ("The fair market value is the price at
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Consider the following example. A taxpayer has a $1 million piece of
rental real estate. She contributes this real estate to a limited liability
company and then gifts a twenty-five percent membership interest in this
limited liability company to each of her four children. Each membership
interest is not traded on a public exchange and represents a minority interest
in this enterprise; thus, rather than reporting a $1 million taxable gift for gift
tax reporting purposes, the taxpayer instead can likely show a taxable gift
equal to $600,000 ($1,000,000 less $400,000 ($1,000,000 times forty
percent discount attributable to the nature of the transferred membership
interests)).60 Essentially, by wrapping this property in the form of a limited
liability company, the taxpa er is able to make $400,000 of value disappear
from the transfer tax base. Although this sleight of hand seems too good
to be true, over a decade ago in a major concession to taxpayers, the IRS
gave this technique its imprimatur of approval.62
Properly structured zeroed-out GRATs and the use of valuation
discounts illustrate that when it comes to transfer tax minimization
techniques, taxpayers have had a myriad of options. What made these
transfer tax savings options particularly attractive is that they presented
taxpayers with little downside risk, and they were readily comprehensible.
As a result, for the past two decades, taxpayers have continuously exploited
these and several other transfer tax savings techniques.6
Assuming that Congress will at some point eliminate several of the
most utilized estate planning techniques, including zeroed-out GRATs and
valuation discounts, resourceful taxpayers will seek alternative means to
minimize their transfer tax burdens. Therefore, they will likely turn to sales
which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts.").
60. Id.
61. Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Family Limited Partnerships:
Discounts, Options, and DisappearingValue, 6 FLA. TAX REv. 649, 650 (2004).
62. Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202.
63. While the sale of a non-controlling interest may present a downside risk-the IRS
could argue that the sales price was inadequate and that a gift tax should therefore be paidestate planners have devised strategies that minimize or eliminate such risk. See, e.g., Petter
v. Comm'r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 534 (2009) (rejecting the IRS's attempt to revalue the
sold/gifted units based on a clause inserted in the documents that would divert units to
charity in the event of such a revaluation).
64. In the estate tax area, a quick review of continuing legal education programs
signifies these techniques' prominence. See generally Steve R. Akers, Advanced Transfer
Planning,Including Strategies to Maximize Benefits of GRATS and Sales to GrantorTrusts
Given Recent Market Declines, SR002 ALI-ABA 801 (2009); Lawrence P. Katzenstein,
Some Interest-Sensitive Estate Planning Techniques (with an Emphasis on GRATS and
QPRTS), SR034 ALI-ABA 109 (2010); William D. Kirchick, Using GRATS in a Down
Economy, SR013 ALI-ABA 211 (2009); David Pratt, Update on Use of Family Limited
Partnershipsand Discount Planning,SP037 ALI-ABA 399 (2009).
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to grantor trusts and other tax-saving techniques, enduring the complexity
and artificiality that such techniques engender. The IRS and Congress,
however, do not have to be wallflowers and allow taxpayers free rein to
subvert the transfer tax base. Instead, as discussed in the next two sections,
the IRS and Congress have many weapons at their disposal to defeat such
sales and other estate planning techniques.
III. WHAT THE IRS CAN Do TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE
TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM

The IRS has several weapons in its arsenal to defeat the kinds of
transactions that Congress did not expressly authorize or sanction and that
erode the transfer tax base. In the sections that follow, we outline how the
IRS is at liberty to (A) revoke and rewrite flawed revenue rulings, (B) craft
new Treasury regulations, and (C) invoke the application of the codified
economic substance doctrine. Using this latitude, the IRS can eliminate
sales to grantor trusts and other techniques that subvert the transfer tax
system.
A. Revoke and Rewrite FlawedRevenue Rulings
The IRS promulgates its administrative positions in several different
forms, includin revenue rulings, revenue procedures, notices, and
announcements. Among these forms, the IRS has historically articulated
some of its most important positions via revenue rulings. "Revenue rulings
are official interpretations by the Service, which are prepared in the
Associate Chief Counsel Offices and published in the Internal Revenue
Bulletin by the Service."6 Such rulings represent the IRS's position on a
particular set of facts and conclusions of law and are published with the
intention that a particular issue will be handled with uniformity throughout
68
the country.
Once the IRS issues a revenue ruling, the agency has the prerogative to
change it. And despite the fact that the IRS can exercise this power
retroactively,6 9 it generally only exercises this power prospectively. 70 Many
65. The transfer tax base is very broad and is theoretically designed to capture all
lifetime transfers, see I.R.C. § 2512 (2006), and include all property owned directly and
indirectly at death, see I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2035-38 (2006).
66. See generally Donald L. Korb, The Four R's Revisited: Regulations, Rulings,
Reliance, and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View from Within, 46 DuQ. L. REV. 323
(2008) (former chief counsel for the IRS explaining the nature of administrative information
that the IRS issues).
67. Id. at 330.
68. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d) (as amended in 1987).
69. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1965) (explaining why the IRS
can retroactively apply its own rulings). But see Silco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 779 F.2d 282, 286-

988

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:973

times, the impetus underlying such administrative changes is a wellreasoned court ruling that results in an IRS loss; 7 1 other times, the IRS will
revoke a prior ruling if the agency believes its position is simply contrary to
the existing state of the law.
When it comes to the tax consequences associated with sales to grantor
trusts, the IRS has promulgated Revenue Ruling 85-13, which ironically
lays the foundation for the acceptability of such transactions.7 3 Rothstein v.
United States7 4 is the case that led the IRS to issue this revenue ruling. In
Rothstein, the taxpayer had established an irrevocable trust in which the
taxpayer's wife was the sole trustee and his children were the income
beneficiaries.76 Several years after establishing the trust, the taxpayer
purchased shares of stock in a closely held corporation from the trustee,
using as consideration an unsecured promissory note.77 Subsequent to this
exchange (which, according to the taxpayer's position, did not give rise to
taxable income), the taxpayer liquidated the closely held corporation.7 8 By
using the shares' purchase price (i.e., the amount of the note) as the shares'
cost basis, the taxpayer then claimed that the corporate liquidation gave rise
to a short-term capital loss. 79
In adjudicating this case, there were two issues that required resolution.
The first was whether the terms of the trust were such that it should be
classified as a grantor trust, and the second was the tax consequences that
flowed from this classification.80
87 (5th Cir. 1986) (taxpayer's position upheld based upon a reliance on previously issued
revenue rulings); Rauenhorst v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 157, 170, 172 (2002) (finding that,
generally, the Tax Court treats a revenue ruling as a concession by the IRS that the agency
must either withdraw or modify before it can take a contrary position).
70. See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(c) (as amended in 1987) ("Where Revenue
Rulings revoke or modify rulings previously published in the Bulletin the authority of I.R.C.
§ 7805(b) of the Code ordinarily is invoked to provide that the new rulings will not be
applied retroactively to the extent that the new rulings have adverse tax consequences to
taxpayers.").
71. See, e.g., Estate of Wall v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 300, 312-13 (1993) (resulting in the
IRS's revocation of Rev. Rul. 79-353, 1979-2 C.B. 325, and replacing it with Rev. Rul. 9553, 1995-2 C.B. 191, the terms of which are consistent with the Wall decision).
72. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202 (acknowledging, after suffering a
series of court defeats over a period of several years, that minor and marketability discounts
are permissible for gratuitous transfers of closely held business interests).
73. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
74. Rothstein v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1983), rev'd, 735 F.2d 704
(2d Cir. 1984).
75. See id.; Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.
76. Rothstein, 574 F. Supp. at 20.
77. Id. at 2(-21.
78. Id. at 21.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 22.

2011]

SALES TO GRANTOR TRUSTS

989

At the district court level, the IRS prevailed: the court ruled that
because the rantor could indirectly borrow from the trust, the trust was a
grantor trust. , The court further found that the taxpayer had a carryover tax
basis in the corporate shares (i.e., equal to the tax basis in the hands of the
grantor trust) and disallowed the taxpayer's putative loss on the corporate
liquidation.Q To illustrate this with numbers, if the trust had a $10 basis per
share in the corporation in question and the purchase price paid by the
grantor was $100 per share, the court would rule that the purchasing
taxpayer had a $10 basis per share. If the taxpayer then liquidated the
corporation and the liquidation proceeds were $30 per share, the taxpayer
would have experienced a $20 gain per share (i.e., $30 - $10).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's decision. While it agreed with the lower court's classification
analysis (i.e., the instrument in question established a grantor trust), it
disagreed with the consequences that stemmed from this classification.84
Writing for the majority, Judge Friendly read the grantor trust statute in a
literal fashion, claiming that it attributed items of income, deductions, and
credits from a grantor trust to its grantor.s In all other respects, the terms of
the Code were fully applicable, includinj the provisions stating that a sales
transaction gives rise to gain or loss, 6 and an asset's purchase price
constitutes its cost basis.8 7 Accordingly, on the corporate liquidation, the
court allowed the taxpayer a loss, because the amount of the liquidation
proceeds were less than the taxpayer's cost basis in his shares. For
illustration purposes once again, if the trust had a $10 basis per share in the
corporation in question and the purchase price was $100 per share, the
Second Circuit would rule that the purchasing taxpayer had a $100 basis per
share. If the taxpayer then liquidated the corporation and the liquidation
proceeds were $30 per share, the taxpayer would experience a $70 loss per
share (i.e., $30 - $100).89
81.
Id. at 23.
82. Id.
83. Rothstein v. United States, 735 F.2d 704, 710 (2d Cir. 1984).
84. See id at 708-09.
85. See id at 709 ("[Section] 671 dictates that, when the grantor is regarded as
'owner,' the trust's income shall be attributed to him-this and nothing more.").
86. I.R.C. § 1001.
87. I.R.C. § 1012 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
88. Rothstein, 735 F.2d at 710.
89. Although the sale of the corporate stock by the trustee to the taxpayer gave rise to
a gain, this gain was apparently able to be reported on the installment method, a fact that
apparently irritated the government. See id. ("The Government's grievance apparently
derives from the fact that, . . . neither the taxpayer nor the trust had reported a capital gain on
the sale of the IDI shares in 1964."). Congress has since put a limitation on the use of the
installment method in this context. I.R.C. § 453(e) (2006). See, e.g., Shelton v. Comm'r, 105
T.C. 114, 120 (1995) (In return for an installment note, a taxpayer sold the stock of a closely
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After suffering a defeat at the hands of the Second Circuit, the IRS
hastily issued Revenue Ruling 85-13, announcing that it would not follow
the Rothstein decision, because it reconized the separate existence of a
grantor trust for tax reporting purposes.9 In other words, the agency would
continue to ignore all dealings that a taxpayer had with respect to a grantor
trust, including the recognition of gains and losses and tax basis
determination issues.9 1
In retrospect, the IRS should have applauded the Rothstein outcome.
The Second Circuit's holding makes clear that transactions between a
taxpayer and a grantor trust should not be ignored. While its holding might
seem to invite opportunities for abuse (e.g., taxpayers could engage in
transactions with their alter egos (grantor trusts)), losses arising between
related parties are traditionally disallowed; 9 2 and, if necessary, Congress
could have crafted a provision requiring that gains arising from such
related-party transactions could not be used to absorb capital losses or net
operating losses.
As long as Revenue Ruling 85-13 is retained, it will serve to sanction
the use of sales to grantor trusts. As such, it will enable taxpayers to use
such sales as tools to chisel away at their transfer tax obligations. As with
any revenue ruling that taxpayers use as a mechanism to defeat their tax
obligations, the IRS should examine the merits of the ruling and the risks
associated with revoking it. An analysis by the IRS would likely reveal that
the agency should revoke Revenue Ruling 85-13-and for that matter, any
other revenue ruling that taxpayers use to defeat legitimate tax
obligations-and let the Rothstein decision stand.93 Put differently, the IRS
should not allow itself to be a wallflower, passively watching as the federal
coffers are drained.

held business to related parties who subsequently liquidated the company; the Tax Court
held that this liquidation was a second disposition and, as such, was subject to I.R.C. §
453(e), which "was enacted as a response to the use by taxpayers of installment sales to a
related intermediary in order to defer recognition of gain while at the same time effectively
realizing appreciation on the property by means of a resale to a party outside the 'related
group' for an immediate payment.").
90. Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.
91. See id.
92. I.R.C. § 267(a) (2006).
93. Note the fact that a longstanding revenue ruling followed by the issuance of a
contrary regulation does not undercut an agency's deference claim. See, e.g., Smiley v.
Citibank (S. D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996). Instead of issuing new regulations, if
the IRS simply issued a new revenue ruling, it would only be entitled to limited deference.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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B. CraftNew Treasury Regulations
The IRS has a potent weapon at its disposal against which taxpayers in
general have a difficult time avoiding. Specifically, in interpreting the
Code, the IRS can issue regulations that command deference from the
courts. We analyze below (1) the current deference standard and its
application and (2) the latitude that deference affords the IRS in responding
to transfer tax avoidance techniques such as sales to grantor trusts.
1. The Current Deference Standard and Its Application
The origin of how courts defer to administrative agency decisions is
long, difficult, and complex to trace.94 However, the current deference
standard, embodied in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Counsel, Inc.,9 and reinforced by the recent Supreme Court decision in
Mayo Foundationfor Medical Education & Research v. United States,96 is
relatively easy to understand and apply.
By way of background, the IRS is able to issue "legislative" regulations
(i.e., regulations that frame a specific body of law) in accordance with a
specific delegation from Congress. 97 Under the general authority of I.R.C. §
7805(a), the service can also issue "interpretative" regulations (i.e.,
regulations that offer guidance as to what a specific statutory body of
language means or signifies)." The courts had applied different levels of
deference to these two types of regulations." In Mayo Foundation, the
94. See generally Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice,36 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 731 (2002) (describing the history of judicial deference to
administrative interpretations).
95. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
96. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 704 (2011).
97. See Kristin E. Hickman, Agency Speciic Precedents: Rational Ignorance or
DeliberateStrategy?, 89 TEx. L. REV 89, 104 (2011) (explaining the history of regulations
issued pursuant to a general grant of authority and specific grant of authority); see also
I.R.C. § 1502 (2006) (authorizing the Treasury Department to promulgate regulations that
delineate how those corporations that qualify can file tax returns on a consolidated basis);
N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON LEGISLATIVE GRANTS OF REGULATORY
AuTHORiTY 1, 2-6 (Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/
ContentFolders20/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/ll21Report.pdf (estimating that there are
approximately 550 such provisions in the Code).
98. See Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 1, 7 (2000) ("An interpretive
regulation is issued under the general authority vested in the Secretary [of the Treasury] by
section 7805, . . ."); Comment, Denying Retroactive Effect to Invalidation ofAdministrative
Rules, 12 STAN. L. REV. 826, 830-31 n.25 (1960) ("Treasury regulations, often classified as
interpretive, are regarded as merely stating the Treasury's construction of the statute.").
99. See Mayo Found., 131 S.Ct. at 713; ("In two decisions predating Chevron, this
Court stated that 'we owe the [Treasury Department's] interpretation less deference' when it
is contained in a rule adopted under that 'general authority' than when it is 'issued under a
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Supreme Court stated that the same standard of deference, the Chevron
standard, should apply to both types of regulations. 00
In determining whether an administrative agency's statutory
construction should be upheld, the Supreme Court in Chevron enunciated a
two-step analysis."o" Step one is to determine whether "the intent of
Congress is clear"; if it is, ". . . the agenc[] must give effect to the

unambiguous expressed intent of Congress." 0 Step two occurs only if the
intent of Congress is unclear (i.e., the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to a specific issue); in those situations, "the question for the court to
determine is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute."' 0 Regarding step two, the Supreme Court, in
another case, noted that "we defer to the Commissioner's regulations as
long as the 'implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable
manner.'I Accordingly, only when an agency's construction of an
unclear statute is unreasonable does judicial deference to an agency's rulemaking authority end. 0 5
Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner is an illustrative case that
demonstrates how the application of the Chevron standard applies to
Treasury Department regulations.106 The facts contained in Swallows
Holding are straightforward: the taxpayer was a Barbados corporation that
owned U.S. rental property.'o 7 This rental property generated income and
experienced concomitant deductions; however, the taxpayer failed to file
tax returns for tax years 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996, delaying such
submissions until 1999.108
I.R.C. § 882(c)(2) provides that a foreign corporation "shall receive the
benefit of the deductions .. . allowed to it ... only by filing or causing to be
filed . . . a true and accurate return, in the manner prescribed in subtitle F . .
. ."109 On the basis of this section, because the taxpayer failed to file timely
specific grant of authority to define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a
statutory provision."'). See generally Gans, supra note 94 (describing the history of judicial
deference to administrative interpretations).
100. Mayo Found., 131 S.Ct. at 714.
101. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 843.
104. United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001)
(quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967)).
105. Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 515 F.3d 162, 169 (3rd Cir. 2008).
106. See id. at 162. See generally Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax
Regulations: A Reconsideration in Light of National Cable, Swallows Holding, and Other
Developments, 61 TAx LAW. 481 (2008) (discussing judicial deference in light of recent
cases including Swallows Holding).
107. Swallows Holding, 515 F.3d at 165.
108. Id.
109. I.R.C. § 882(c)(2) (2006).
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tax returns for the tax years in question, the IRS denied the taxpayer the
normally allowable deductions."
In 1957, many years subsequent to the passage of § 882(c)(2), the IRS
issued regulations pertaining to this rule but did not require that a tax return
be filed by a set time."' Over three decades later, the IRS again issued
regulations pertaining to this rule; this time, however, in order for a
taxpayer to secure the deductions allowable under the Code, the IRS set
forth a general filing deadline of eighteen months from the time of the
return's due date.1 12 The issue before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit was the validity of this regulation that adopted a defined filing
deadline.113
In commenting on the appropriate deference standard, the Third Circuit
cited to the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mead Corp.,114
declaring that the "Chevron deference is appropriate only in situations
where 'Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force
of law.'"" Under I.R.C. § 7805(a), the Third Circuit observed that
Congress directly invited the IRS to promulgate regulations; that being the
case, the agency was delegated the authority to make law.' 16 Having laid
this groundwork, the Third Circuit then concluded that "the resulting
regulation is entitled to the Chevron deference if it survives Chevron's two
prong inquiry."'' 7
Under step one of Chevron, the Third Circuit decided that the statute
was written ambiguously (i.e., I.R.C. § 882(c)(2)'s filing requirement used
the phraseology in the mannerprescribedin subtitle F, but the statute failed
to elaborate on whether this phraseology contained a temporal
component)." 8 In light of this statutory ambiguity, the Third Circuit
proceeded to conduct step two of Chevron and sought to determine the
reasonableness of the IRS's actions." 9 In conducting its reasonableness
analysis, the Third Circuit offered the following observation: generally,
"[r]ules represent important policy decisions, and should not be disturbed if
'this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies
110. Swallows Holding, 515 F.3d at 172.
111. See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-4 (as amended in 1990); 22 Fed. Reg. 8377 (Oct. 24,
1957).
112. See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-4(a)(3)(i).
113. Swallows Holding, 515 F.3d at 164.
114. 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
115. Swallows Holding,515 F.3d at 168 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 229).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 169-70 (citing McNamee v. Dep't of Treasury, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007);
Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Comm'r, 348 F.3d 136 (6th Cir. 2003); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
United States, 142 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Cook, 494 F.2d 573 (5th Cir.
1974)).
118. Id. at 170.
119. See id. at 170-72.
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that were committed to the agency's care by the statute .... .120 With this
observation in mind, the Third Circuit upheld the regulation's validity,
ruling that it was eminently reasonable since the regulation helped the
agency fulfill its oversight responsibilities.121 In a closing comment, the
Third Circuit added that "Chevron recognizes the notion that the IRS is in a
superior position to make judgments concerning the administration of the
ambiguities in its enabling statute."l 22
On numerous other occasions after Chevron, the Supreme Court has
reiterated the deference that IRS regulations should command and the
latitude with which the IRS can craft such regulations. Indeed, in Mayo
Foundationfor Medical Education & Research v. United States,' 23 not only
did the Supreme Court reiterate the Treasury Department's ability to amend
its own regulations if troubled by a court's resolution of an outcome,12 4 it
clarified the universality of the Chevron decision:
The principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply with full force in
the tax context.

. .

. Filling gaps in the Internal Revenue Code plainly

requires the Treasury Department to make interpretive choices for
statutory implementation at least as complex as the ones other agencies
must make in administering their statutes.

. .

. We see no reason why our

review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency expertise
pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our review of other
regulations.125
The Mayo Foundationdecision represents a culmination of sorts for the
Chevron deference standard.126 In instances of statutory ambiguity, Mayo
Foundationexplicitly invites administrative agencies, including the IRS, to
promulgate reasonable regulations that support the agency's position (even
if the agency previously embraced a contrary position).127

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 171 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)).
Id. at 172.
Id.
See generally Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S.

Ct. 704 (2001).
124. Id. at 712-13.
125. Id. at 713 (citations omitted).
126. Note that the Supreme Court's decision in Mead endorsed the use of the Chevron
deference standard but in the context of interpretive tax regulations. See, e.g., Swallows
Holding, 515 F.3d at 168 (relying, as indicated in the text, on Mead for the proposition that
Chevron controls in this context).
127. The only time that an administrative agency's latitude to craft regulations would
not be afforded deference would be in those instances when the statute in question was held
to be unambiguous. See Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 257
(4th Cir. 2011) (holding that because the statute in question was determined to be
unambiguous, Chevron deference was not applicable).
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In the next section, we explore ways in which the IRS should accept the
Supreme Court's invitation and draft treasury regulations that defeat
transfer tax avoidance techniques such as sales to grantor trusts, regardless
of whether the taxpayer's position was previously sanctioned by the
courts.12 8
2.

The Latitude Afforded the IRS in Responding to Transfer Tax
Avoidance Techniques

In instances when Congress unambiguously provides taxpayers with
methods to reduce their transfer tax burdens, the IRS must permit such
methods to go unchallenged. 129 Indeed, it would be unconstitutional for an
agency that is part of the executive branch to invalidate or overrule an
unambiguous statute enacted by Congress. 13 0 For example, I.R.C. § 2702
permits taxpayers to form qualified personal residence trusts.1'3 In terms of
transfer tax savings, even if the IRS dislikes the transfer tax savings that
these trusts are able to achieve, the agency is at a loss to challenge the
viability of such trusts.13 2
In contrast, consider those situations in which Congress has either not
spoken or has spoken ambiguously and taxpayers are exploiting such
congressional silence or statutory ambiguities. In these cases, via § 7805(a),
Congress has delegated to the IRS the ability to draft regulations that curtail
such exploitation. In the paragraphs that follow, we suggest regulations
that the IRS could draft that would put an end to sales to grantor trusts and
possibly other transfer tax exploitation devices as well.
Let's start with sales to grantor trusts. There are at least two different
regulations that the IRS could promulgate that would have a significantly
chilling effect on taxpayers using this technique.

128.
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1 (as amended in 2010). After experiencing a
court defeat in Simpson v. United States, 183 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1999), the IRS rewrote this
particular regulation to largely mirror its litigation position. As one author of this paper
observed many years ago, "[i]n effect, rather than continuing to litigate with taxpayers, the
government declared victory by regulation." Gans, supra note 94, at 746. In effect, deference
cases such as Nat '1 Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967
(2005), enable the Treasury Department to rewrite tax regulations in a way that overrules
judicial defeats.
129. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.").
130. Cf id
131.
See I.R.C. §2702 (2006); see also McCouch, supra note 52, at 99 (discussing
special valuation rules).
132. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
133.
See supra Section III.B.1.
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The first regulation would expand the application of I.R.C. § 2036.
Consider the fact that if a taxpayer transfers property into a trust and retains
an income right to the property transferred, such a retained right causes
estate tax inclusion of the transferred property.134 Insofar as sales to grantor
trusts are concerned-where the income generated on the property sold
generally is used to satisfy the installment payment obligations-how do
tax practitioners currently avoid the application of § 2036? They instruct
taxpayers to first contribute "seed money" to the trust, wait, and then use
this seed money as a down payment to purchase the property owned by the
grantor.135 At least until now, tax practitioners have expressed confidence
that adding seed money to the process eliminates § 2036 concerns.136
However, the IRS has the liberty to append the following provision to the §
2036 regulations: Taxpayers who, in exchange for a promissory note, sell or
exchange property to a trust will be considered to have retained an interest
in such transferred property until such note is satisfied. This proposed
provision is aligned with the underlying purpose of § 2036, which is to
bring back into a taxpayer's gross estate those assets in which taxpayers
retain either a direct or indirect interest, or both direct and indirect interests
in transferred property.137 In the case of a sales to a grantor trust, there is
compelling evidence that the transferred trust property is the most critical
resource that sustains installment note paments, and as such, the grantor
has obviously retained an interest therein.'
The second regulation would target the "bona fide sale" exception to §
2036.139 Under this exception, the Code nullifies the application of § 2036
"in case of a bonafide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth."' 4 0 The Code specifically uses the adjective bona fide to

134. See I.R.C. § 2036(a).
135. Mulligan, supra note 19; Louis A. Mezzullo, Freezing Techniques: Installment
Sales to GrantorTrusts, 14 PROB. & PROP. 16, 19 (2000).
136. At least two commentators have argued that seed money is not a necessary
predicate to avoid I.R.C. § 2036 application. See Elliot Manning & Jerome M. Hesch,
Beyond the Basic Freeze: FurtherUses ofDeferred Payment Sales, 34 INST. ON EST. PLAN.
16 (2000).
137. See I.R.C. § 2036.
138. As suggested, there is dictum in an old Supreme Court decision, FidelityPhiladelphiaTrust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274, 277 (1958), to the effect that the use of seed
money can be used to negate the application of I.R.C. § 2036. Because the relevant portion
of the decision in Fidelity-Philadelphiais not a holding, but only dictum, the IRS would be
free to take a different approach by regulation. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). Were the agency to adopt new regulations, it
should withdraw or qualify Rev. Rul. 77-193, 1977-1 C.B. 273 (offering tacit endorsement
of the dictum found in Fidelity-Philadelphia).
139. See I.R.C. § 2036(a).
140. Id.
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modify the noun sale.141 As recent cases have concluded, this language
suggests that the exception should not be available unless there is a
sufficient non-tax purpose for undertaking the transaction.14 2 Based on these
cases, the IRS should add the following provision to the bona fide sale
exception: When there is a sale between the taxpayer and a party who is
unrelated to the taxpayer (as defined in § 267(b)), the bona fide sale
exception automatically applies; in all other cases, there is a rebuttable
presumption that a sale is not bona fide unless the taxpayer is able to
present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary (i.e., there was a
legitimate business purpose underlying such sale). In the case of most sales
to grantor trusts, this bona fide element will be absent, because the
motivation of the taxpayer-grantor for entering into this transaction is
clearly grounded in transfer tax savings rather than a legitimate business
purpose.
If the IRS promulgated the foregoing recommended Treasury
regulations, some commentators might assert that the IRS would be
overstepping its bounds. However, consider how the agency has recently
proposed regulations that are designed to put an end to the use of private
annuities as devices to achieve transfer tax savings.
A private annuity is a transaction where a taxpayer exchanges property
with another taxpayer (usually a younger member of the transferor's
family) in return for an unsecured promissory note requiring periodic
payments until a set price is met or the transferor of the property dies.14 3 In
a series of prior judicial decisions spanning the course of several decades,
courts have held that such exchanges should be treated as open transactions,
applying the annuity proceeds first against the tax basis of the exchanged
141. See Estate of Schutt v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353, 1364 (2005) ("In probing
the presence or absence of a bona fide sale and corollary legitimate and significant nontax
purpose, courts have identified various factual circumstances weighing in this analysis.
These factors include whether the entity engaged in legitimate business operations, whether
property was actually transferred to the entity, whether personal and entity assets were
commingled, whether the taxpayer was financially dependent on distributions from the
entity, and whether the transferor stood on both sides of the transaction.").
142. See, e.g., Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367, 383 (3d Cir. 2004);
Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004); Estate of Bongard v. Comm'r, 124
T.C. 95, 122-23 (2005); Estate of Hillgren v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1008, 1014
(2004); Estate of Stone v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M.(CCH) 551, 578-79 (2003); Estate of Strangi
v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1336-37, 1343 (2003); Estate of Harper v. Comm'r, 83
T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, 1648 (2002). If I.R.C. § 2036 exception instead read "in case of a sale
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth," it would have strongly
implied that nonbusiness reasons could motivate such sale and, in those instances, that such
transactions would have qualified under this exception.
143. John K. Pierre, Using Intra-FamilySales in Estate Freezing: The Prospects in the
Year 2000 andBeyondfor PrivateAnnuities and Self-CancellingInstallments Notes, 24 S.U.
L. REv. 207, 208 (1997); John G. Brant, A New Look at the PrivateAnnuity, 22 COLo. LAW.
733 (1993).

998

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:973

asset and regarding the exchanges as taxable when received only after full
basis recovery has been achieved. 1" In 1953, the IRS acceded to this
position and issued Revenue Ruling 53-239.145 In 1954146 and again in
1963,0 the IRS made two unsuccessful attempts to have Congress adopt
provisions that would have triggered, upon property exchange, an
immediate tax upon the entire realized gain. In 1969, the IRS issued
Revenue Ruling 69-74,148 which retracted Revenue Ruling 53-239 and
declared gain resulting from the private annuity exchange to be taxable to
the transferor in a ratable fashion (i.e., each annuity payment would
simultaneously constitute a return of basis and a taxable gain).149 But in a
reversal of its own position, in 2006, the IRS issued proposed Treasury
Regulation 1.1001-l(j)(1).so This proposed regulation overrules existing
case law and the agency's own administrative guidance, treating the value
of the annuity as an amount realized under I.R.C. § 1001 and triggering
immediate taxation of the entire realized gain. 5 By promulgating this
Treasury regulation, the IRS has effectively eliminated any opportunity for
taxpayers to postpone taxable gains on dispositions associated with private
annuities; as a practical matter, the IRS's actions have severely curbed the
use of private annuities as an estate planning device. 5 1
If the IRS can deliver the death knell to private annuities, there is no
reason it cannot do the same for grantor trusts and other aggressive transfer
tax savings devices. Aside from the proposed regulations we recommend,
there are a host of other Treasury regulations-too numerous to expand
upon here-that the IRS could issue that would put the brakes on many
such devices. 15 3 Chevron and Mayo Foundation have paved the path for the
144. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Kann's Estate, 174 F.2d 357, 358-59 (3d Cir. 1949) (holding
that an individual's unsecured promise to pay an annuity to another has no fair market value
for the purpose of computing capital gain); Lloyd v. Comm'r, 33 B.T.A. 903, 904-05 (1936)
(holding that a promise to make future payments has no fair market value until actual
payments are made).
145.
1953-2 C.B. 53.
146. H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at A286 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4025,
4111; S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 116 (1954), reprintedin 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4629, 4749.
147. H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 88TH CONG., PRESIDENT'S 1963 TAX MESSAGE 134
(Comm. Print 1963) (statement of the Secretary of the Treasury).
148.
1969-1 C.B. 43.
149. See id.
150. Exchanges of Property for an Annuity, 71 Fed. Reg. 61,441 (proposed Oct. 18,
2006).
151. Alan S. Lederman, Proposed Regulations on the Tax Treatment of Private
Annuities Would Generally Make Them Unattractive, 106 J. TAX'N 175, 175-76 (2007).
152. See generally id. (explaining why private annuities are no longer a practical taxsaving device).
153. For example, via Treasury regulations, the IRS should seek to overturn the
outcome in Petter v. Comm'r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 534 (2009). In Petter, the Tax Court
approved the use of a so-called value definition clause. Id. at 544. This clause provided that
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IRS to follow; hesitancy on the agency's part to take action is proving
costly to the fisc.
C The Economic Substance Doctrineand Transfer Taxation
When a taxpayer sells an item to a grantor trust (i.e., the taxpayer's
alter ego), the transaction on its face appears driven entirely for tax
avoidance purposes.1 54 Therefore, this naturally raises the question of how
the Code should treat these sales and others that lack economic substance
from the perspective of the income tax.
By way of background, the IRS and courts have historically denied
taxpayers losses, credits, and other benefits otherwise allowable under a
literal reading of the Code and regulations if the transactions that gave rise
to these tax benefits lacked economic substance.'s In tax parlance, this
gloss on the Code became known as the economic substance doctrine.5 6
Despite the IRS's success in using the economic substance doctrine to

in the event the value of a sold asset is determined to exceed the selling price, the excess
would pass to charity. Id. at 537. By passing the excess to charity and qualifying for a gift
tax charitable deduction under I.R.C. § 2522, the taxpayer avoids any gift tax imposition. Id.
at 538. If such a clause is inserted into a sales document, the IRS has no incentive to raise
valuation issues on audit, because no gift tax revenue can be generated. Given the
deleterious nature of value-definition clauses in terms of undermining transfer tax
enforcement, the IRS should craft Treasury regulations that nullify their effect and render
them void ab initio as a matter of public policy based on a codification by regulation of the
decision rendered in Comm'r v. Proctor, 142 F.2d 824, 827 (4th Cir. 1944) (holding a clause
designed to defeat gift tax imposition if a tax audit resulted in increased value of the gift to
be void against public policy).
154. See generally supra Section II.A (describing tax implications regarding sales to
grantor trusts).
155. Many commentators pin the origin of the economic substance doctrine to Gregory
v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), which states:
In these circumstances, the facts speak for themselves and are susceptible of but
one interpretation. The whole undertaking, though conducted according to the
terms of [the statutory provision], was in fact an elaborate and devious form of
conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else. The
rule which excludes from consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not
pertinent to the situation, because the transaction upon its face lies outside the
plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above
reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose.
Id. at 470.
156. See Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 5, 9
(2000); David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle ofEconomic Substance, 52 TAx LAW 235,
245 (1999); David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of the Anti-Tax Avoidance
Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 88, 89 (2002).
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defeat abusive tax-minimization strategies, there have been many questions
over the years regarding its application. 57
By adding section 7701(o) to the Code,"' the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 clarified the contours of the
economic substance doctrine. Under I.R.C. § 7701(o), for a transaction to
9
have economic substance, taxpayers must meet a twofold test.'" First, the
transaction must change (apart from Federal income tax effects) the
taxpayer's economic position (the objective prong of the test).16 0 Second,
the taxpayer must have a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income
tax effects) in engaging in the transaction (the subjective prong of the
test).' 6 ' If a taxpayer fails to meet both the objective and subjective prongs
of the economic substance doctrine, the tax benefits afforded under Subtitle
A of the Code with respect to a transaction are not allowable.162 For
example, in an endeavor to secure a noneconomic tax loss, if a taxpayer
devises a strategy to artificially increase an asset's tax basis, the IRS would
be at liberty to invoke § 7701(o) to disallow the putative loss associated
with the asset's artificially-inflated tax basis.
Despite the seeming breadth of § 7701(o), there are defined boundaries
to its application. The section's legislative history, for example, reveals that
Congress did not seek to negate or reclassify those transactions that had
long-standing judicial and administrative acceptance, even if the choices
engendered in these transactions were driven by comparative tax
advantages.'" Second, § 7701(o)(5)(B) states that the economic substance
In particular, several courts embraced the view that "a transaction would be
157.
respected for tax purposes if it had either economic substance or a nontax business purpose."
Martin J. McMahon Jr., Living with the Codiied Economic Substance Doctrine, 2010 TAX
NOTES TODAY 158-2 (Aug. 2010) (emphasis added).
158. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §
1409, 124 Stat. 1029, 1067-68 (2010) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7701(o) (West Supp.
2010)).
159. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1).
160. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A).
161. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B).
162. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A).
163. Prior to the passage of I.R.C. § 7701(o), the IRS commonly used the economic
substance doctrine to defeat taxpayers' tax-minimization schemes that were devoid of
economic substance. See, e.g., ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 252 (3d Cir. 1998)
(denying, on the basis of the economic substance doctrine, a corporate taxpayer's losses
associated with a partnership created for the purpose of generating a capital loss to offset the
corporation's capital gain). See generally Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11
(Fed. Cl. 2007), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, vacated in part, 598 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(holding that the contribution of offsetting option positions to a partnership followed by a
later property distribution from the partnership to the partners did not have economic
substance and, for tax purposes, could therefore not be respected).
164. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL 44 (Comm. Print
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doctrine should not apply to an individual taxpayer's personal transactions;
accordingly, § 7701(o) only applies to those transactions entered into in
connection with a trade or business or an activity engaged in for profit. 65
The limitations associated with the breadth of § 7701(o) seem to signify
that it does not apply to gratuitous transfers such as gifts and bequests,
which, by their very nature, lack economic substance.16 6 Indeed, the statute
itself appears to contemplate that a taxpayer may enter into a transaction for
the purpose of securing a transfer-tax advantage without running afoul of
the provision. Given the courts' rejection of the antecedent case-law
doctrine in the transfer-tax context,'6 7 and the reality that transfers for
estate-planning purposes are often inherently tax-driven,16 8 the statute's
failure to focus on transfer-tax savings is not unexpected. Nevertheless, as a
matter of sound tax policy and to expand its effectiveness, it would make
sense to alter § 7701(o)'s focus to also include targeting abusive transfertax strategies.
Sales of assets to grantor trusts potentially constitute a class of such
transactions when the invocation of an expanded § 7701(o) would be
particularly compelling. Why? While the sale to grantor trust has one foot
in the transfer tax realm and is specifically designed to minimize transfer
2009) (offering four examples of permissible tax planning, such as the choice between
capitalizing a business enterprise with debt rather than with equity).
165.
I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(B).
166. See Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Comm'r v. Lo
Bue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956); Bogardus v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937)) (internal
quotations omitted) (noting that a gift stems from "disinterested generosity" rather than from
"the incentive of anticipated benefit" of an economic nature); see also Estate of Cristofani v.
Comm'r, 97 T.C. 74, 84 (1991) (indicating that the fact that a gift was motivated by tax
concerns did not prevent the taxpayer from enjoying the annual exclusion); Richard M.
Lipton, 'Codification' of the Economic Substance Doctrine-Much Ado About Nothing?,
112 J. TAX'N 325, 329 (2010) ("This means that estate and gift planning transfers, which
invariably lack a business purpose, are not affected by the codification of the economic
substance doctrine.").
167. See, e.g., Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 279, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting an IRS argument based on the case law doctrine of economic substance in the
transfer tax context). For cases in which the courts did take into account business purpose in
the transfer tax context, however, see, e.g., Holman v. Comm'r, 601 F.3d 763, 770 (8th Cir.
2010) (although not relying upon I.R.C. § 7701(o) (the passage of which postdates the fact
pattern of this case), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that for gift tax
valuation purposes, because the supposed business entity in question conducted "no
'business,' active or otherwise," the valuation of its interests had to be determined under
I.R.C. § 2703(a) because the bona fide business arrangement exception rule under § 2703(b)
did not apply); Fisher v. United States, No. 1:08-cv-0908-LJM-TAB, 2010 WL 3522952, at
*3-*4 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2010).
168. See Estate of Cristofani v. Comm'r, 97 T.C. 74, 84 (1991) (recognizing that the
gift transaction before the court was tax motivated, but nonetheless upholding the tax
treatment sought by the taxpayer).
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taxes,169 it has another foot entirely in the income tax sphere insofar as the
operative document (i.e., an installment sales agreement between the
taxpayer and the trustee of the grantor trust) denotes that the transaction in
question is a bona fide economic arrangement between two disinterested
parties.170 It is with respect to this latter "foot" that an expanded § 7701(o)
would offer the IRS an opportunity: it might then be able to use this Code
section to attack the nonrecognition of gain sought by the taxpayer, even
though a possible reading of other sections of the Code might produce a

contrary result.171
Recall how the typical sale to grantor trust operates. The taxpayer
contributes funds to a grantor trust; using these funds as a down payment,
the trustee of the grantor trust purchases an appreciating asset from the
taxpayer, paying the balance of the purchase price with an installment note.
The trust earns income, and the taxpayer remains liable for the tax upon that
income. On the installment note, the trustee of the grantor trust makes
principal and interest payments until the note is fully satisfied.'72 An
expanded § 7701(o) could be a highly effective weapon in the IRS arsenal
in combating these abusive transactions.
When it comes to revising the economic substance doctrine (now
codified in § 7701(o)) to defeat taxpayer transactions that intertwine
gratuitous transfers with business transactions, there exists historical
precedence. For example, consider the long lineage of gift-leaseback
jurisprudence. 7 3 The facts in these cases often followed a common pattern:
Taxpayers establish non-grantor trusts with their children as beneficiaries;
taxpayers then gift title to real property to these trusts; these trusts, in turn,
lease the contributed real property back to the taxpayers. 74 The whole
169. See John B. Huffaker & Edward Kessell, How the Disconnect Between the
Income and Estate Tax Rules CreatedPlanningfor GrantorTrusts, 100 J. TAX'N 206, 206
(2004).
170. See id. at 210.
171. The agency has unfortunately drawn flawed conclusions (epitomized in Rev. Rul.
85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184) as to what should be the appropriate tax outcome. As previously
discussed, see supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text, the IRS should revoke Rev. Rul.
85-13 and thereby remove its tacit endorsement that transactions between taxpayers and
grantor trusts fail to give rise to any income tax implications. Alternatively, the IRS should
issue notice that with respect to those transactions deemed to lack economic substance, the
agency will no longer be bound by Rev. Rul. 85-13.
172. See supra Section II.A (explaining the foundation and advantages of how grantor
trusts operate).
173. See, e.g., Scott W. Brinkman, Gifts and Leasebacks: Is Judicial Consensus
Impossible?, 49 U. CiN. L. REV. 379 (1980); G. L. Cohen, Transfers and Leasebacks to
Trusts: Tax and Planning Considerations, 43 VA. L. REV. 31 (1957); Robert J. Peroni,
Untangling the Web of Gift-Leaseback Jurisprudence,60 MINN. L. REV. 735 (1984); Rona J.
Rosen, Gift-Leaseback Transactions: An Unpredictable Tax-Savings Tool, 53 TEMP. L.Q.
569 (1980).
174. In tax parlance, these particular trust vehicles were known as Clifford trusts,
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purpose of this arrangement was to enable contributing taxpayers (whose
income was subject to high marginal tax rates) to secure rent deductions
and assign the corresponding rental income to related taxpayers, namely,
their children, whose income was subject to low marginal tax rates. 75
On numerous occasions, the IRS challenged the validity of such giftleaseback arrangements.'7 6 In several instances, the IRS's position was
upheld: Courts ruled that because income assignment was the force driving
these arrangements, the transaction in question failed the business purpose
test.17 7 In many other instances, these arrangements were held to be bona
fide, and taxpayers were allowed deductions for their rental payments.178
What the sale-leaseback lineage of cases signifies is that the IRS would be
within its historical prerogative to use an expanded § 7701(o), as it has
previously used the business purpose doctrine to challenge gratuitous
transfers cloaked as legitimate business transactions.
With respect to sales to grantor trusts, if the IRS invoked an expanded §
7701(o), the effects would be salutary. Taxpayers are currently at liberty to
engage in such sales in ways that enable them to manipulate the tax system
to their advantage. Aside from the sale of appreciating assets to a grantor
trust, for example, consider the flexibility that taxpayers enjoy when the
eponymously named after Helvering v. Clfford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). Typically, these trusts
were irrevocable with terms of ten years and two days and with property reverting back to
the taxpayer after the designated trust term lapsed.
175. See I.R.C. § 1 (2006) (progressive tax rate structure). But see I.R.C. § 1(g) (2006)
(taxing unearned income of children under age 19 at their parents' highest marginal tax
bracket).
176. See Rev. Rul. 54-9, 1954-1 C.B. 20, modifedon other grounds, Rev. Rul. 57-315,
1957-2 C.B. 624, stating thus:
Accordingly, it is held that the transfer of real property to a trust for a 10-year
period for the benefit of grantor's children with his wife as one of two trustees,
with the corpus to go to the grantor's wife in the event of his death prior to the
expiration of a 10-year period, and with a privilege of leasing back such property
from the trustees constitutes a transfer in form rather than substance. Rental
payments made to the trust by the grantor will not constitute deductible business
expenses. The grantor will remain the owner of the property during the term of the
trust for purposes of Federal income and gift taxes, and the rental payments when
made will constitute gifts.
Rev. Rut. 54-9, 1954-1 C.B. 20
177. See, e.g., Matthews v. Comm'r, 520 F.2d 323, 324 (5th Cir. 1975) (sale-leaseback
lacked economic reality and thus the rent deductions associated with the lease were
disallowed); Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235, 236 (4th Cir. 1975) (sale-leaseback
transaction was ignored because it lacked business purpose).
178. See, e.g., Brown v. Comm'r, 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir. 1950) (rent payments
constituted legitimate business obligations and as such, were deductible); Skemp v. Comm'r,
168 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1948).
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terms of an irrevocable trust that has grantor trust status no longer suit the
taxpayer's needs or desires. In those circumstances, a taxpayer can establish
a new irrevocable trust that also has grantor trust status with more favorable
terms and have its trustee purchase the prized assets of the irrevocable trust
with the unfavorable terms.179 Despite the lack of economic substance
engendered by such transactions, such transactions (and others like them)
have remained shielded from taxation to date. 80 The addition of an
expanded § 7701(o) to the IRS's arsenal of weapons would presage the
possible end of these taxpayer-friendly outcomes.
As indicated, in the sphere of transfer taxation, § 7701(o) currently has
limited application. Congress should consider expanding the application of
§ 7701(o) to make it applicable to abusive transfer tax arrangements.
Admittedly, distinguishing abusive from non-abusive transactions will not
be easy. Nevertheless, a sale to a grantor trust arrangement should readily
fall on the abusive side of the line.
IV. WHAT CONGRESS CAN Do TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE
TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM

Even if the IRS does its job and monitors tax compliance and the courts
do their job in adjudicating disputes between the IRS and taxpayers, the
transfer tax system will fail to achieve its intended goals of curtailing
inherited wealth and raising tax revenue,' ' unless Congress plays a more
active role in promoting the integrity of the transfer tax system. First,
Congress should eliminate absurdities that make the transfer tax system
appear farcical to ordinary taxpayers. Second, when Congress learns of a
statutory flaw or oversight, it should act with alacrity to remedy the
problem.
A. EliminatingAbsurditiesfrom the Transfer Tax System
Many Code provisions are designed to make the tax system more
administrable, efficient, and equitable.' 82 In theory, these provisions are
grounded in logic and common sense; however, in practice, some of these
very same tax provisions have spawned elaborate estate planning
techniques that have shrouded the transfer tax system with absurdities, thus

179. See Rev. Rul. 2007-13, 2007-1 C.B. 684.
180. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-18-061 (May 6, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2005-14-001 (Apr. 8, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-47-006 (Nov. 22, 2002).
See, e.g., James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv.
181.
825, 825 (2001).
182. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDITURES 25-27 (1973).
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subverting its public stature. The subsections below highlight three such
emblematic provisions.
1. The Grantor Trust Rules
Taxpayers who engage in sales transactions with grantor trusts often
marvel at the fact that the Code sanctions their use in ways that produce
tremendous transfer tax savings. At the core, what must truly astonish
taxpayers is that they can sell appreciated property to an irrevocable trust in
which they lack any meaningful indicia of control (hence, such trust assets
are not part of their gross estate); however, due to the antiquated grantor
trust rules, the taxability of such transactions is ignored.18' The stunning tax
savings that such sales produce cast a harsh light on the interrelationship of
the income and transfer tax systems,184 strongly beckoning Congress to take
remedial action.
On the one hand, Congress should consider large-scale reform and
attack the root of the problem. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 compressed the
and also
income tax bracket structure for both estates and trusts
introduced the "kiddie tax," a system whereby the unearned income of
minor taxpayers is essentially taxed at their parents' highest marginal tax
rates.186 Together, bracket compression and the kiddie tax have largely
eliminated the need for the grantor trust rules (which, in large part, were
designed to curtail taxpayers' ability to assign income to other taxpayers,
such as estates, trusts, and minor children whose incomes, at least in the
past, were generally subject to lower marginal tax rates). 8 7 Combine this
obsolescence with the fact that the grantor trust rules are now being used as
devices to defeat taxpayers' transfer tax obligations, and what becomes
evident is that Congress should take decisive action and repeal these
rules, retaining them only in those instances when the trust in question is
revocable.189
On the other hand, if Congress were to lack the courage or the political
will to scrap the grantor trust rules in their entirety, it could institute limited
reform measures. More specifically, Congress could amend the Code to
provide that all sales between taxpayers and grantor trusts constitute taxable
183.
184.
185.

See supra Section II.A.
See Danforth, supra note 7, at 546.
See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 10 1(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2096-

97.
186. Id. § 1411(a) (enacting I.R.C. § 1(g)).
187. See, e.g., Roswell Magill, What Shall Be Done with the Clifford Case?, 45
COLUm. L. REV. 111 (1945) (explaining taxpayers' motivations for utilizing trusts as an
income tax-savings device).
188. This proposal largely mirrors a proposal recommended by another commentator.
See Ascher, supra note 41, at 888.
189. Id. at 930.
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events.190 By imposing a tax friction on such transactions, most taxpayers
would no longer use sales to grantor trusts as a device to circumvent their
transfer tax obligations.
2. The Annual Exclusion for Present Interest Gifts
In order to avoid having small or token gifts subject to gift tax,
Congress instituted the annual gift exclusion found in I.R.C. § 2503(b).19 '
Under this Code section, "present interest gifts" are excluded from gift tax,
and the donor need not file a gift tax return.192 To qualify for this exclusion,
such gifts cannot exceed a specified dollar threshold, which is adjusted
annually for inflation (in 2011, this dollar amount is $13,000).'19
To illustrate the mechanics of the present interest rule, consider the
following two fact patterns. In 2011, if a mother gifts $13,000 to her
daughter, no gift tax is due, and the mother need not file a gift tax return.
Suppose instead that the mother makes an identical $13,000 gift, but this
time she places the cash in trust for her daughter's benefit. Under these
circumstances, the present interest gift tax exclusion would not apply (i.e.,
the gift into a trust constitutes a future interest),194 and the mother would
have to file a gift tax return and either use a portion of her lifetime gift tax
exemption (currently, $5 million)' 95 or, if the mother's lifetime gift tax
exemption were exhausted, pay gift tax.196
Taxpayers have not responded idly to the present interest exclusion.
Under the terms of most inter vivos trusts that are irrevocable, taxpayers
have fashioned a window period of withdrawal (usually thirty days), during
which trust beneficiaries can withdraw contributed gifts. 97 As long as
notice of this window period is given, this window period of withdrawal
190. This adjustment could most likely be done by adding a new section to I.R.C. §
1001. This subsection would direct that transactions between taxpayers and all grantor trusts,
except those trusts that are revocable, would be recognized.
191. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2006); H.R. REP. No. 72-708, at 29-30 (1932); S. REP. No. 72665, at41 (1932).
192. I.R.C. § 6019 (2006).
193. I.R.C. § 2503(b)(2).
194. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (as amended in 2011) (."Future interest' is a legal
term, and includes reversions, remainders, and other interests or estates, whether vested or
contingent, and whether or not supported by a particular interest or estate, which are limited
to commence in use, possession, or enjoyment at some future date or time.").
195. See I.R.C. § 2505(a)(1) (2006).
196. See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (2006).
197. Malcolm A. Moore, Crummey Trusts, in 26 PHILIP E. HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON
ESTATE PLANNING 203.1 (John T. Grubatz ed., 1992); Bradley E.S. Fogel, The Emperor
Does Not Need Clothes-The Expanding Use of "Naked" Crummey Withdrawal Powers to
Obtain Federal Git? Tax Annual Exclusions, 73 TUL. L. REv. 555, 571 (1998); Kent Mason,
An Analysis of Crummey and the Annual Exclusion, 65 MARQ. L. REv. 573, 593 (1982).
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appears to transform otherwise future interest trust contributions into
present interest gifts qualifying for the annual exclusion. In Crummey v.
Commissioner,19 this creative strategy was given a judicial imprimatur of
legitimacy; indeed, the eponymously named Crummey withdrawal powers
are probably the most commonly incorporated feature of virtually every
newly minted inter vivos irrevocable trust.' 99
Crummey withdrawal powers operate to readily defeat the underlying
purpose of the gift tax annual exclusion-namely, to shelter taxpayers from
the administrative inconvenience of having to account for those gifts that
are considered de minimis in nature, such as birthday, wedding, and holiday
presents. As a result of widespread Crummey power usage, vast amounts of
wealth escape from the transfer tax base. Furthermore, its usage makes a
mockery of the present interest exclusion. 2 00 Left unchecked, the use of
Crummey withdrawal powers siphons large sums of dollars from the
transfer tax base and casts the transfer tax as a Maginot Line of sorts that
can be easily circumvented.
However, a minor legislative change could make Crummey withdrawal
powers a thing of the past. Simply put, Congress could declare that any and
all direct and indirect contributions to irrevocable trusts fail to qualify for
the present interest exclusion.20 1 Institution of this simple provision would
be the death knell for Crummey withdrawal powers and simultaneously
strengthen the integrity of the transfer tax system.

198. Crummey v. Comm'r, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
199. See, e.g., Henry B. Greenberg, Estate and Gifi Issues Relating to Irrevocable
Trusts, DITM MA-CLE 1-1 (2009) (explaining how practitioners should incorporate
Crummey provisions into irrevocable trusts); L. Henry Gissel, Jr., Closing Thoughtsfor This
Century on Crummey and Other Irrevocable Trusts (Including Insurance Trusts), SE35
ALI-ABA 521 (1999) ("Crummey clauses are a familiar estate planning device.").
200. Bradley E.S. Fogel, Back to the Future Interest: The Origin and Questionable
Legal Basis of the Use of Crummey Withdrawal Powers to Obtain the Federal Gifi Tax
Exclusion, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 189, 193 (2003) ("It cannot be argued that Crummey powers are
anything other than a ruse."); John L. Peschel, Major Recent Tax Developments in Estate
1401 (1981) ("[T]he Crummey power, in
Planning, in 33 U.S. CAL. TAX INST. ch. 14,
theory, has a strong legal basis but, in practice, emits an equally strong odor of sham.");
Willard H. Pedrick, Crummey Is Really Crummy!, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 943, 948 (1988) ("[T]he
[Crummey] withdrawal right is transparently a flim flam."); Benjamin N. Henszey,
Crummey Power Revisited, TAXES: THE TAX MAGAZINE, FEB. 1981, AT 76, 77 ("[T]he IRS is

aware that the [Crummey] power is a sham in most cases."); DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REVENUE PROPOSALS 130 (Feb. 1998),

availableat http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/grnbk98.pdf
(noting that "the Crummey power is essentially a legal fiction").
201.

Cf TASK FORCE ON FED. WEALTH TRANSFER TAXES, REPORT ON REFORM OF

FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXES 97 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/

tax/pubpolicy/2004/04fwtt.pdf (describing a similar legislative proposal).

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

1008

[Vol. 78:973

3. The Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Exemption
Current law provides that a generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax
applies if certain events transpire (as defined by the Code to be a taxable
distribution, a taxable termination, or a direct skip) 2 02 in which assets pass
to "skip persons" (i.e., essentially a transferee who is two or more
generations younger than the transferor).203 In those instances when a GST
tax event occurs, GST tax is applicable. 2 04 The GST tax rate is set to equal
the highest marginal estate tax rate. 205
The legislative purpose behind instituting the GST tax was to defeat
attempts by wealthy taxpayers and their families to circumvent the estate
tax.20 As an example, suppose a taxpayer establishes a trust for the lifetime
benefit of his child with the remainder to his grandchild. The terms of this
lifetime trust provide the child with the following rights and privileges: an
income stream, principal distributions in accordance with an ascertainable
standard, lifetime and testamentary special powers of appointment, and the
annual ability to withdraw the greater of $5,000 or five percent of the trust
corpus. Notwithstanding that during the child's lifetime, he could
potentially reap rich financial benefits from the trust, the trust's property
would not be includable in the child's gross estate upon the child's death
for purposes of the federal estate tax.207 Such transfers and others like them
were and continue to be the targets of the GST tax, which imposes a tax in
instances (such as the one posited in the above example) when gratuitous
wealth transfers are not subject to tax at every generational level.2
To curtail the application of the GST tax to only those instances when
taxpayers and their families were truly seeking to circumvent their transfer
tax obligations in a significant fashion, Congress added a limited exemption
to the GST tax.209 Its application enables taxpayers to transfer a certain
dollar amount (currently, $5 million) free of the GST tax. 210 For instance, a
taxpayer can make a $5 million gift to a grandchild without incurring a
GST tax. 211
Notwithstanding congressional intentions of providing a limited
exception to GST tax application, taxpayers have capitalized upon the GST
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

I.R.C. § 2611(a)(l)-(3) (2006).
I.R.C. § 2613(a) (2006).
I.R.C. § 2641(a) (2006).
Id.
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX

1976 564-66 (Comm. Print 1976) (explaining the need to introduce the
generation-skipping transfer tax).
207. See I.R.C. § 2033.
208. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
209. See I.R.C. § 263 1(a) (2006).
210. I.R.C. § 2631(c); I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3)(A).
211. See I.R.C. § 2631(c); I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3)(A); I.R.C. § 2613(a).
REFORM ACT OF
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tax exemption in ways that Congress probably never envisioned. Indeed,
taxpayers exploiting this exemption can pass wealth, free of GST tax, not
only to so-called "skip" people who are two generations below them (such
as grandchildren) but also to much more distant generations such as greatgrandchildren and great-great-grandchildren.2 12 This ability to pass property
to very distant generations without the application of a GST tax combined
with the eradication by most states of their rules against perpetuities has
given rise to an era of dynasty trust formation.2 13 Utilizing the GST tax
exemption, wealthy families can now establish trusts, funded with millions
of dollars, which are essentially insulated from transfer tax for possibly
214
centuries and millenniums to come.
But there is a relatively easy fix to the dynasty trust problem. Congress
can limit GST tax exemption allocation to those instances in which the
property in question vests with a skip person not more than two generations
below the transferor (i.e., the transferor's grandchildren). If property vests
or could vest with a skip person more remote (e.g., great-grandchildren),
Congress could prohibit taxpayers from making a valid GST exemption
allocation.215 By narrowing the application of the GST tax exemption in this
fashion, Congress would protect the transfer tax base and help eradicate the
wealth disparities that dynasty trusts generate.2 16
In sum, the three devices summarized above-use of grantor trusts,
Crummey withdrawal rights, and dynasty trusts-do not exhaust the field of
tax absurdities, but they are representative of the systemic problems
inherent in the Code. These absurdities generate taxpayer cynicism, which
212. See I.R.C. § 2631(c); I.R.C. § 2613(a).
213. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Waggoner, Message to Congress: Halt the Exemption for
Perpetual Trusts, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 23, 23-24 (2010) (decrying the use
of perpetual trusts by wealthy taxpayers); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach,
Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and
Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 410-11 (2005) (finding that roughly $100 billion in trust assets
had flowed into trusts governed by state law that allow perpetual or near-perpetual trusts and
that impose no state income tax on trust income produced by funds originating from out of
state).
214. See Waggoner, supra note 213, at 23-24.
215. See STAFF REPORT OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 393, available at http://www.house.gov/
jct/s-2-05.pdf (Several years ago, the Joint Committee on Taxation made this
recommendation.).
216. See, e.g., Ray D. Madoff, America Builds an Aristocracy, N.Y. TIMES July 10,
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/opinion/12madoff.html (bemoaning
the surge of dynasty trust use in United States). Another proposal worthy of consideration
would be for Congress to institute a federal law adopting the rule against perpetuities. See
Mitchell Gans, Federal Transfer Taxation and the Role of State Law: Does the Marital
Deduction Strike the Proper Balance?, 48 EMORY L.J. 871, 879 (1999) ("To remedy [the
problem of perpetual trusts], a federal rule limiting the duration of exempt trusts, . . . would
be necessary.").
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in turn causes taxpayers to believe that the whole transfer tax system is rife
with corruption, i.e., nothing more than a charade in which only those "not
in the know" are forced to participate.
B. Act with Alacrity to Remedy Legislative
Shortcomings and Oversights
One of the most interesting things about the problems confronting the
transfer tax system is that they are hiding in plain sight. For example,
virtually any practitioner journal or programming agenda of any estate
planning continuing legal education series offers readily available planning
devices that exploit legislative shortcomings and oversights.217 The effects
of this publicity are twofold. First, the public discourse and exchange of
ideas helps to refine these devices, making them less susceptible to IRS
challenge and attack. Second, the very act of publicizing these planning
devices provides them with an aura of legitimacy, lending traction and
credence to their acceptability.
The availability of this knowledge is in sharp contrast to the tax shelter
problem that beset the nation during the 1990s. Consider the fact that
during the 1990s, tax practitioners were dispensing numerous putative taxsaving strategies that were costing the nation billions of dollars of lost tax
revenue annually.2 18 Part of the success of these strategies was that this
subterfuge was clandestine; 219 indeed, as part of these arrangements,
participating taxpayers were often required to sign nondisclosure
agreements. The clandestine nature of these arrangements allowed them to
flourish, particularly, because many of these strategies eluded detection
upon audit. Once these methodologies were brought to light, the IRS and
then the courts agreed that these arrangements lacked economic substance,

217. See, e.g., Steve R. Akers, Estate Planning in 2010 and Beyond: Now What?,
SS007 ALI-ABA 1 (2010); S. Stacy Eastland, Some of the Best Estate PlanningIdeas We
See Out There, CS004 ALI-ABA 29 (2010); Lawrence P. Katzenstein, Some InterestSensitive Estate Planning Techniques (with an Emphasis on GRATS and QPRTS), SR042
ALI-ABA 151 (2008); Domingo P. Such, III, Advance Transfer Tax Planning Issues for
EstatePlanningfor the Family Business Owner, SS008 ALI-ABA 597 (2010).
218. See COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & Gov'T AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL
FIRMS INTHE UNITED STATES TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY, S. REP. No. 109-54, at 11 n.21 (2005),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109srpt54/html/CRPT-109srpt54.htm
(reporting that, according to the General Accounting Office, a recent IRS consultant
estimated that between 1993 and 1999, the IRS lost on average between $11 billion and $15
billion each year from abusive tax shelters).
219. See Chin-Chin Yap, The Tax Shelter Game, 59 TAX LAW. 1021, 1022 (2006)
("Likewise, the results of enforcement efforts to stem the tide of abusive tax shelters are
speculative at best in the secretive, elastic, and innovative world of the tax shelter
industry.").
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largely putting an end to their existence.220 In the aftermath of the financial
damage that such techniques caused the government, Congress
subsequently instituted various disclosure measures designed to curb the
reoccurrence of such tax shelters and to put the IRS on notice regarding the
use of these and similar income tax shelter techniques.m
But in the transfer tax sphere, Congress has not exercised this same
vigilance. This is evidenced by the fact that Congress has a readily
available road map-via practitioner journals and continuing education
legal lecture series-of the most utilized transfer tax savings devices. There
are a host of reasons why Congress has taken little or no action to defeat
such devices, but the primary one is lack of political will. Although the
transfer tax system remains an easy target for scorn and ridicule if it
continues to be littered with loopholes and silly absurdities such as those
described in the prior subsection, constituents are not interested in paying
more taxes. This dislike of the transfer tax system has translated into
complete inaction toward making it any sounder, allowing it to remain
dysfunctional. Indeed, over the past decade, there have been numerous
proposals championed to eliminate the transfer tax system in its entirety 222
223
or to strip it of any effectiveness.
At some future point in time, if Congress wants to make the transfer tax
system more effective, it can readily do so by closing publicized loopholes.
Establishing a transfer tax oversight commission that reports annually to
Congress would be a step in the right direction. Assuming that the
commission's recommendations are taken seriously, quick congressional
action to close down transfer tax planning strategies will have a significant
salutary effect: It will drive practitioners to be less vocal about their
planning ideas and exploitation devices, and in the absence of these
techniques being tested and refined in the public domain, it will have a
tremendous chilling effect upon their use.
In the realm of transfer tax reforms that Congress should undertake, the
suggestions outlined above are but a smattering of the plethora of changes
220. Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, COBRA Strikes Back: Anatomy of a
Tax Shelter, 62 TAx LAW. 59, 60 (2008).
221.
Taxpayers are required to disclose the details of reportable transactions in which
they participate by filing IRS Form 8886, "Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement,"
with the IRS Office of Tax Shelter Analysis in Ogden, Utah. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(d)
(2010). At least one commentator has praised the effectiveness of such disclosure
requirements. See Ronald A. Pearlman, Demystifying Disclosure: First Steps, 55 TAX L.
REv. 289, 323 (2002) (asserting that disclosure measures are a "powerful tax enforcement
tool" leading to "enhanced compliance").
222. See, e.g., Death Tax Repeal Permanency Act of 2005, H.R. Res. 202, 109th Cong.
(2005) (calling for the elimination of the transfer tax system).
223. See, e.g., Permanent Estate Tax Relief Act of 2006, H.R. Res. 885, 109th Cong.
(2006) (raising the exemption to $5 million and setting the top estate tax rate equal to the
capital gains tax rate).
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that should be legislatively instituted. Notwithstanding this fact, if the
above few recommendations were instituted and an oversight commission
was put into place, ordinary taxpayers would most likely take their transfer
tax obligations more seriously, resulting in greater taxpayer compliance.
Correspondingly, the transfer tax system would become much better
positioned to accomplish its intended goals of curtailing inherited wealth
and raising revenue.
V. CONCLUSION

As evidenced by statistical data, transfer taxes apply to only the
wealthiest slice of taxpayers.225 These same taxpayers have ample resources

to secure professional advice and to devise ways to minimize their transfer
tax burdens. And for close to a century,226 they have received a healthy
return on their professional advice investment, reaping huge transfer tax
savings. 227
A sale to grantor trust represents one planning device that has gained
traction in the estate planning community and will likely gain in popularity
as Congress is possibly poised to put the brake on other techniques. As the
popularity of this technique gains momentum, it threatens the vibrancy of
the transfer tax system by reducing its capacity to raise revenue and to curb
accumulations of inherited wealth.228 Other transfer tax savings devices
play this same destructive role, and new device formulations no doubt loom
on the horizon.
In its existing arsenal, the IRS has weaponry at its disposal to defeat
these transfer tax savings devices. In particular, under Chevron, the
Supreme Court has accorded the IRS significant latitude to draft Treasury
regulations that can eliminate many of these planning devices. 229 The only
question is how far the IRS can go in successfully employing this strategy
without generating the perception that it is overreaching.
The strength of statutory language, rather than regulations, however,
ultimately dictates the soundness of any tax system. That being the case,
Congress must be vigilant and nimble in crafting legislation and should
curb taxpayers' ability to game the system. Furthermore, once Congress
224. See Repetti, supra note 181.
225. For most years that the estate tax has been in effect, its application has been
limited to two percent of the nation's wealthiest individual taxpayers. Darien B. Jacobson,
Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting, IRS
PUBLICATIONs, June 22, 2007, at 118, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/ninetyestate.pdf; Jane G. Gravelle, CRS Updates Estate Tax Options Report, 2010 TAX
NOTES TODAY 114-23 tbl.1 (2010).
226. See Act of September 8, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756.
227. See Schmalbeck, supra note 10.
228. See Repetti, supra note 181.
229. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864-66.
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learns that taxpayers have devised methods to breach the system, it must
230
react with deliberate speed to close such statutory gaps.
A case study is typically representative of a larger phenomenon and, as
such, can be an effective tool in analyzing important policy issues.
Examining a sale to grantor trust is such a case study. This technique
represents a broad spectrum of transfer tax savings strategies, and the use of
this device illuminates those reform measures that are necessary to improve
and overhaul the transfer tax system. Like any case study, however, its
ultimate effectiveness is determined by whether those with political power
heed its lessons and actually apply them.

230. Rhetorical question: After the court decision in Walton v. Commissioner, 115 T.C.
589 (2000), acq. 2003-2 C.B. 964, which sanctioned the use of zeroed-out GRATs, why has
Congress not yet taken action to close this gaping loophole?

